Preliminary assessment by the Juvanile Justice Board is mandatory and the procedures laid down under Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, during the trial proceeding ought to be strictly followed- Supreme Court.

On March 22, 2024, the Supreme Court of India delivered a judgment in the case of Thirumoorthy vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, stressing the imperative adherence to the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015. Justices Mehta S. and BR. Gavai presided over the case, which involved the quashing of criminal proceedings due to procedural lapses laid down under S.15 and S.19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 by the trial courts.

Keywords.

Mandatory procedures to be followed under the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, Quash of criminal and investigation proceedings, set aside of juvanil justice proceedings. 

Case Name- Thirumoorthy vs. State Rep. by the Inspector of Police, 

Judge Name- Hon’ble Justice, Mehta. S., and Hon’ble Justice, BR. Gavai. 

Professional insights gained from this judgment.

This judgment can be used by our professionals where there are procedural illegalities committed by the trial court while treating the juvenile offenders. Moreso, this case law helps the juvenile accused, who had not been produced before the Juvenile Boards for a preliminary assessment. Further, it has to be seen that a de-nova investigation cannot be done when the juvenile offender has been ignored from assessments by the Juvenile Justice Board. 

Brief Summary

The appellant, Thirumoorthy, challenged his conviction and sentencing for various offenses, including abduction, wrongful confinement, and murder. One of the key aspects of this appeal tends to be that the trial court has failed to follow the mandatory procedures laid down under S.15 and 19 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015.  The top court highlighted the appellant’s juvenile status at the time of the incident and emphasized the violations of the mandatory procedures prescribed under the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act) in the investigation and trial process. It was established that the appellant’s date of birth was May 30, 2000, confirming his status as a child in conflict with law (CICL) at the time of the offense. The top court found that the trial court had failed to comply with the JJ Act’s requirements, including conducting a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board, leading to the vitiation of the entire proceedings. This assessment serves as a crucial step in evaluating the mental and physical capacity of the juvenile to understand the gravity of the offense and its consequences.

The judgment primarily discussed the legal provisions S.15, 18(1), and S.19 which a children’s court ought to follow for a juvenile who is more than 16 years of age and has been accused of heinous crimes under the JJ Act. 

Section 15 of the JJ, Act stipulates that a juvenile offender who has been accused of a heinous crime should be preliminary assessed by a Juvanile Justice Board with regard to his mental and physical capacity to commit such an offense and his ability to understand the consequences of the offence. Such assessment should be passed in the form of an order under Section 18 of the JJ, Act. Then, if such Board opines that such Juvanile ought to be investigated/prosecuted further, the said order shall be transferred to the Childer’s Court. By virtue of Section 19(1), the Children’s Court, upon receiving such a report of preliminary assessment undertaken by the Board under Section 15, may further decide as to whether there is a need for trial of the child as an adult or not.

In the above context, the top court has emphasised the mandatory nature of conducting a preliminary assessment by the Juvenile Justice Board in cases involving heinous offenses committed by a child above the age of sixteen. It was noted by the top court that the accused appellant’s direct filing of the charge sheet in the Sessions Court without presenting him before the Juvenile Justice Board was illegal, as the same is in violation of the JJ Act. The court concluded that due to the violations of the mandatory procedures, the entire proceedings against the appellant were vitiated, and no further action was deemed necessary. As a result, the court quashed the impugned judgment and ordered the immediate release of the appellant, given his present age of nearly 23 years, thus allowing the appeal.

Further, the top court also distinguished its own judgments (Karan Aliias Fatiya vs. State of Madhya Pradesh and Pawan Kumar vs. State of  Uttar Pradesh), as the same tends to be different from the facts and circumstances of the present case. 

Most importantly, the top court further emphasized the aspect that a de-nova proceedings cannot be initiated once again when a clear-cut mandate u/s 15 and 19 of Juvenile Justice Act failed to have been fulfilled by the trial court. 

Other things to be remembered from the judgment.

“ex post facto imprimatur is illegal,“ which means what is done afterwards with an official warrant is illegal. This has been used by the top court to state that the prosecution cannot make the case legal when approvals have been provided by the trial court for such a prosecution.

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